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Abstract
Security research recognizes the effect of “being
seen” in reducing the likelihood of security violations
in the workplace. This has typically been construed in
the context of formal monitoring processes by
employers, but there is an emerging notion that
workers care about what their workplace colleagues
think of them and their activities. We leverage this idea
of the “Eyes of Others” in motivating pro-security
behaviors to apply to security contexts. We find that,
for a set of worker self-perceptions including Morality
and Self-Consciousness, the likelihood of engaging in
mundane workplace security violations is impacted by
the knowledge that coworkers are watching. This has
important implications for novel expansions of
deterrence research in IS Security, going forward.

1. Introduction
Organizations rely heavily on their information
systems, and for this reason the need to protect
confidential information and reduce information
security risks has become vital [2]. As is widely agreed
in the literature, company employees (corporate
insiders, to use the rubric) are the weak link in the
organizational security chain [7, 8, 31], and improving
the employees’ security awareness and compliance
has always been a crucial task [2]. Most of the research
has focused on formal security policies and the factors
which have led to their breach or observance, with an
eye towards building a better security cultures in firms.
Hence, there is a lack of consideration for informal
factors which may influence employee security
compliance behavior. One of these factors is a
potential violator’s awareness of being overseen by
onlookers in the workplace, when contemplating
behavior that violates the security policies of the firm.
We characterize this onlooker dynamic on the part
of coworkers watching each other as the “Eyes of
Others” in terms of the potential motivational impact
that the knowledge of being seen in performance of
some sanctioned activity might have on perpetrators.
The organizational behavior literature has a number of
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interesting examples of the onlooker effect and how it
influences employee behavior, ranging from social
desirability effects of being seen with the “right
group” [6], to the influence of peers and their visibility
during the performance workplace activities [22, 28]
to actual technology use implications related to
influences on workplace behavior arising from the
knowledge of being seen by others using some
inappropriate technological application in the
workplace [26].
Individuals, whether at work or in their private
lives, are vulnerable to the self-perceived perceptions
of others in their groups of association [6], and our
view is that this interpersonal approval dynamic can
influence how workers adhere to security policy
practices when their activity is discernable by their
coworkers. As we consider the literature, however, we
see several studies reinforcing the impact of onlooker
awareness on individuals [11, 25], but nothing specific
to the likely influence it might have on security
practices; hence, this remains a fruitful area for
inquiry.
The onlookers we consider as influencing these
interesting peer-pressure effects in the workplace are
actors for whom the coworker’s action is visible, but
who are not directly involved in the coworkers’
activities [22, 26]. We call this peer visibility effect
the “Eyes of Others,” and suggest that it is probative
for preventing security violations in the workplace in
addition to likely influencing pro-security behaviors,
as well.
To that end, the purpose of this paper is to develop
and begin the validation process for measures that can
be used to assess onlooker effects which may
influence security behaviors in the workplace. We
consider that, in addition to developing the emergent
“Eyes of Others” construct, a second contribution of
this study might be the development of a set of
measures for mundane workplace security violations,
as there are no formal measurement inventories for
such violations in the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows: after a brief review
of the onlooker effect, we describe our methodology
for measure development and then report the results of
a study of a model that examines the impact of the
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“Eyes of Others” construct on an inventory of typical
workplace security policy violations. We conclude
with theoretical directions and applications for
measures of the onlooker effect and security
violations.

2. The onlooker effect: Eyes of others.
Individuals are not alone in the workplace; most
of the time they have colleagues around who may play
an informal, even inadvertent, monitoring role as
regards the propriety of certain technology use
behaviors on the job. Onlookers are those who are
available in a situation and are aware of another
individual’s action by seeing or hearing it but are not
personally involved in the action, themselves, other
than as observers. The onlooker role in the specific
context of unauthorized use of personal technology at
work has been discussed [26], in the specific setting of
handheld personal devices in medical workplaces.
This work suggests that onlookers’ inferences,
judgments, and reactions can trigger users to reflect on
consequences of their unauthorized technology use
and to adjust their use as a result.
There are a variety of different onlooker influences
to be found in workplaces: coworkers serve as
onlookers [12, 30], as do managers [19] and even more
informal collegial workplace relationships [26]. Coworkers provide a positive point of context for
beneficial self-evaluation [6], but also serve as a social
touchpoint for the value of working relationships [28],
as a point of influence in organizational change [22],
and as a preventive influence in mediating negative
behaviors [11].

2.1. The onlooker effect and deterrence
The tie to behavioral security research for the
importance of understanding the onlooker effect
would come through various applications of
deterrence theory [9, 10, 16]. Though the specific
presence of social “others” viewing potential security
breaches is not explicitly treated in the deterrence
theory literature on information security, there are
plentiful implications for a social role in prevention.
One factor is embarrassment or shame that might arise
from a perpetrator realizing that others in the
workplace know of his/her inappropriate activities [9].
While classic deterrence approaches to IS security are
comprised explicit influence factors such as likelihood
of punishment, severity of punishment and speed of
punishment for infractions, the notion of shame arising
from the knowledge of the infraction on the part of
others having a deterrent effect cannot be discounted.

Deterrence theory approaches to behavioral IS
security also consider the role that formal monitoring
plays in preventing infractions [10], indicating that, to
date, the monitoring effect in deterrence models has
largely been construed as organizational surveillance
of computer use. Even so, there is an undercurrent in
the deterrence theory literature on IS security that
implicitly acknowledges a potential role of “social
others” in motivating against security infractions [16].
We seek to clarify the impact of the onlooker effect
and to provide a validated measure of the phenomenon
so that future research can operationally specify the
effect with more precision as an aspect of models in
which social dynamics are utilized in understanding
user compliance with security policies.

3. Initial steps in measure development
This study documents the exploratory and
confirmatory phases of measure development for the
“eyes of others” construct, following orthodox
methods of analysis [5, 20]. The first step, specifying
the domain of construct, can take an inductive or
deductive approach [19] and with no prior measures
available for measuring the onlooker effect (what we
call “Eyes of Others”), the inductive approach was
chosen. We induced the domain of the construct
through qualitative inquiry, engaging in a focus group
encounter with a group of graduate students in
information assurance.

3.1. Item generation: Focus research
A group of 20 MBA students with a concentration
in security were recruited for focus research to explore
the domain of the Eyes of Others construct. They were
asked about the nature of their security perceptions
and for purposes of developing definitions of
processes and factors that might arise from the
presence of informal onlookers in the workplace and
their influence on security behaviors.
The group interview process provided us the
ability to examine these perceptions in-depth with
security-trained individuals, regarding their views of
security processes, typical security breaches and
hypothetical motivations for either following or not
complying with security policies. These questions
were couched as hypothetical in our interactions to
avoid social desirability issues in response [4].
The result of our focus research was a distillation
of key terms and definitions which could be used for
questionnaire development in order to measure
onlooker effects on motivations for security
compliance.
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3.1.1. Descriptive terms for development. Words
used by respondents in the qualitative inquiry include
“Observed,” speaking to the knowledge of being
overseen in the conduct of some activity. The terms
“Guilt,” “Self-Conscious,” “Penalty,” “Anxiety,” and
“Nervous” spoke to preventive motivational factors
that might arise in response to knowledge of the
presence of “the eyes of others” during a security
violation.
Terms that implied motivations that would serve
to support pro-security behaviors, when in the
presence of others, included “Personal Integrity,”
“Personality Traits,” “Security Code,” “Morality,”
“Concern,” “Safety,” and “Trust.” “Pressure” and
“Enforcement” spoke to factors related to
organizational mediation of security behaviors, in the
eyes of others.
3.1.2. Descriptive terms for security violations. A
search of the literature revealed a surprising lack of
scales for measuring mundane workplace security
violations. On the one hand, these behaviors come
under the ready rubric of things that “everybody
knows,” but on the other hand, a more detailed
analysis of such behaviors seemed warranted, if used
for purposes of benchmarking performance of our
Eyes of Others construct.
To that end, we engaged in the identification of
industry sources of information for security violations,
and through the consideration of popular press
information available from Chief Security Officer
groups [15], Fortune 500 technology companies [23]
and popular security sites online [27] we compiled a
list of highly typical mundane workplace security
violations: password sharing, laxity in maintaining
anti-malware protection software, use of personal
storage devices inside the company firewall, personal
web surfing on company computers, and personal
email use at work that involves downloading of
attachments.

3.2. Initial testing
One hundred and four students majoring in
computer information systems from a College of
Business in a large university in the United States
participated in a survey questionnaire for further
model development. In developmental studies of new
theory where broad generality is not the specific goal,
students are generally considered useful subjects
owing to advantageous homogeneity of variance
considerations in theoretical development [3]. As we
are entering the initial phases of defining and assessing

the “Eyes of Others” construct, we consider this an
appropriate tradeoff.
The questionnaire conveyed questions on two
areas: the first part contained five items measuring the
likelihood of engaging in mundane security violations,
which we developed from sources in industry. The
second part contained 14 descriptive Eyes of Oth3ers
items developed in our qualitative pretest.

3.3. Exploratory refinements of the model
An initial exploration of factor structure was
undertaken in order to determine the number of
dimensions underlying the construct. Table 1 and
Table 2 shows the factor loadings for the security
violation and Eyes of Others construct, respectively.
Three onlooker dimensions arose, along with two
security violation. Onlooker factors were Tension,
Morality and Self-Conscious; security violation
factors were Violator and Loafer.
Table 1. Factor loadings on
security violation items
Component
Sharing Password
Antivirus
USB
Surfing
Personal Email

Violator

Loafer

-.039
.286
.674
.804
.818

.844
.678
.237
.188
-.079

Table 2. Factor loadings on
eyes of others items
Component

Penalties
Observe
Nervous
Guilty
Conscience
Integrity
Environment
Personality
Morality
Stressful
Trust
Anxious
Concern
Unsafe

Tension

Morality

.104
.077
.414
.372
.109
.098
.315
.497
.223
.733
.806
.788
.299
.527

.125
.177
.087
.376
.810
.820
.174
.021
.849
.302
.172
.182
.523
.318

SelfConscious
.715
.840
.690
.645
.249
.305
.478
.115
.069
.184
.166
.215
.080
.243
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As can be seen in the initial model of factor
structure, where all paths between all constructs were
explored (shown in Figure 1, with annotations), only
two links between Eyes of Others constructs and
Security Violations constructs arose for further
consideration: Self-Consciousness and Morality, and
in each case, only as regards their impact on the

Violator dimension of security violations. A reduction
in model structure was justified for further
consideration based on the t-values for associated
structural linkages, and this appears in Figure 2,
showing just the Morality and Self-Consciousness
constructs modeled against the Violator construct of
mundane workplace security violations.

Figure 1. Initial PLS model

Figure 2. Reduced PLS model
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3.4. Likely measurement
evolving indicators

properties

of

A prudent step in exploratory measure
development projects such as this is to consider the
likely measurement properties of the proffered scale,
related to trait validity; one way to check these factors
is through the calculation of the Modified Multi-Trait
Multi-Method matrix (MMTMM) [21].

In such an analysis, a calculation of weighted
scores of each indicator in the model (weighted by its
PLS path weight) is summed into a composite score
for all indicators on the construct, which can then be
compared in a correlation matrix for its fidelity with
the actual indicators, themselves. The product of this
analysis is shown in Table 3 for diagnostic use, and
this information guided final revisions to the
exploratory model.

Table 3. Modified MTMM on reduced model indicators

The MMTMM analysis is intended to provide
support for convergence and discrimination on the part
of a proffered set of measures when the indicators on
a given construct correlate highly with the composite
scores for the respective construct, and at the same
time do not correlate highly with composite scores for
different constructs. In our case, Morality and SelfConsciousness are the Eyes of Others constructs we
are examining in the matrix, and their performance is
indicated by the strong correlations seen for
MoralComp (the composite for the Morality construct)
with the actual Morality construct indicators
(Conscience, Integrity and Morality) as well as in
ConscComp (the composite score for SelfConsciousness construct) with its actual indicators
(which are Penalties, Observed, Nervous and Guilty).
As can be seen by the annotations on the matrix in
Table 3, excellent on-construct correlations are
obtained for almost every indicator, the sole exception

being the Guilty indicator which loads strongly across
both constructs.
Since the Guilty indicator loads with its regular
group of items on the Self-Consciousness construct, it
cannot necessarily be said that it does not converge
with the related scale items. It can, however be said
that it does not discriminate against related but distinct
constructs (Morality, in this case) owing to its cross
loading at better than .5. For this reason the conclusion
was to remove the indicator from the inventory and refit the model without it.
One last version of the PLS model was specified
with the Guilty indicator removed, and this is shown
in Figure 3, below. A second MMTMM was then
calculated for good measure without the Guilty
indicator (see Table 4), and shows, as annotated, the
expected strong on-construct and weak off-construct
loadings supportive of trait validity for the remaining
set of indicators for the two constructs.
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Figure 3. Final reduced model

Table 4. Final modified MTMM
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4. Implications for evolving measure
development of “Eyes of Others”
The most parsimonious form of the model that we
specify indicates interesting relationships between the
Morality and Self-Consciousness “Eyes of Others”
constructs and the Violator factor for typical
workplace security violations. This is an initial foray
into the exploration of the domain of the emergent
Eyes of Others construct. To that end, we choose to
interpret our findings tentatively; the results provide
significant insight into the further development of an
Eyes of Others measurement inventory. Our review of
the security literature suggests the likely usefulness of
modeling an onlooker effect in workplace security
behavior, which can perhaps be linked to evolutions of
the deterrence theory models in found in prior studies
[9, 10, 16] since they correspond well with what we
see in our exploration of the Eyes of Others construct,
here.
The typical deterrence theory framework, which
is where we see the onlooker effect potentially fitting
in future research, typically specifies the influence of
motivating factors such as punishments, including
their likelihood and severity [9, 10], but also the likely
role that knowledge of being monitored by sanctioning
authorities for compliance might play in motivating
pro-security behaviors (or, preventing violations) [10].
There is very little in the security literature leveraging
deterrence theory that provides an avenue for applying
peer oversight, but there are some implications well
worth investigating as further refinements are made to
the Eyes of Others construct and its measures.
For instance, the implication for self-perceived
“shame” in the knowledge of workplace others of
one’s inappropriate security activities [9] might
correspond with what we are learning here about
onlooker effects. Certainly, the role of formal
monitoring is well acknowledged, but at the same time
certain authors have speculated on the role of “social
others” in serving as a factor to potentially prevent
violations [16].
To that end, what we learn in the final version of
our reduced model (Figure 3), has implications worth
considering for future Eyes of Others measure use and
final validation steps in the context of a nomological
network arising from existing theory. We can easily
see that a sense of morality augurs against committing
violations, particularly in the view of others. This
seems to imply a notion that workers of strong moral
fiber would not want to be seen violating their moral
codes by others. That is a useful implication, to the
extent that employees with that sort of orientation can
be identified for recruitment, or if the characteristics
of morality can be “trained up” in keeping with the

robust role of SETA programs in the deterrence theory
perspective on IS security [10].
The Self-Consciousness construct speaks to more
basic and better-understood security dynamics; this
construct is indicated by measures that are
thematically related to deterrence precepts. Being
nervous about being observed, in conjunction with
concern about penalties for security violations and the
overarching role of being observed in causing such
outcomes, is a far closer match with deterrence theory
precepts. The issue here, in this exploratory analysis,
is the causal influence of Self-Consciousness on
violations. With a positive link arising in our
modeling, as compared the more easily interpreted
negative link for the Morality-Violator relationship,
more investigation is required to understand its true
nature as to the influence Self-Consciousness plays on
security violation propensity or prevention. One
interpretation, purely speculative, of course, might be
that where Morality clearly serves to prevent mundane
security violations such as personal USB use or
personal email attachment downloads, the SelfConscious worker might be more concerned about
things that bear specific, severe and highly undesired
penalties (per deterrence precepts), and might not be
as concerned about things that “everybody does” and
which likely bear minimal organizational sanction.

4. Conclusion and implications for future
research
This is an exploratory study, aimed at putting
operational substance into the concept of onlooker
effects in the form of the “Eyes of Others,” which
connotes the informal surveillance of workplace
activities by coworkers. Our goal was to initiate the
operationalization of the construct, and, secondarily,
to benchmark a group of measures for mundane
workplace security violations. Given the lack of
objectively benchmarked measures for mundane
security violations in the literature, that outcome,
alone, has probative value for future research.
Measures of security violations, however, were not the
primary goal of our study; rather, they are a mere
convenience for purposes of exploratory modeling of
our key construct of interest, “Eyes of Others,” which
we have explicated and initially explored, here.
To that end, we have achieved our objective by
exploring the domain of the informal onlooker effect
construct, examining dimensionality and investigating
preliminary cause and effect relationships with the
security violation factors that we specified. The next
step in the evolution of the process is to examine the
emergent constructs and their prospective measures in
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a broad sample of useful generality for confirmatory
analysis.
It is clear that there is a time and a place for
exploratory investigations that leverage conveniently
accessed students for a starting point. The precision of
execution and statistical benefits of homogeneity of
variance found in such samples are strong benefits
from these samples [3]. The generality of student
samples is the typical weakness [1]. Our sample was
thematically useful, being comprised of students
trained in an IS security program; many of them had
employment positions in technological workplaces,
particularly at the graduate level, but the fact remains
that this work is based on student samples and is
explicitly limited by that. For that reason, we clearly
delimit our findings and their implications to the
typical benefit of any exploratory study: this is a
starting point for something truly interesting, and the
real work lies ahead in conducting a rigorous
confirmatory analysis with a broad sample of
generality, such as technology industry workers in full
time employment.
Until that time, what we have learned here
suggests to us that deterrence theory perspectives,
particularly those which speculate on the potential
influence of social others [16], are excellent departure
points for further exploration of the Eyes of Others
construct in broader and more general contexts. It is
well understood that people in every walk of life, but
particularly in their place of work, prize the positive
approval of their peers [6], and this peer group
normative influence can easily be leveraged for useful
pro-security outcomes when artfully managed by the
firm, is our general sense from what we have learned
in this study.
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